I. Introduction

The arbitration agreement is, of course, the foundation of the arbitration process, and it therefore inevitably occupies a central place in relation to the enforcement of the arbitral award. Of the five procedural defences to the enforcement of awards set forth in Article V(1) of the New York Convention, three concern the arbitration agreement (or possible subsequent agreements between the parties). Thus, under the Convention, the enforcement of an award may be refused where: (i) there is not a valid arbitration agreement; (ii) the award deals with a dispute or difference falling outside the scope of the submission to arbitration; or (iii) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. In all three of these cases, an award may also be set aside or refused enforcement under the UNCITRAL Model Law (Articles 34 and 36) and the laws of most jurisdictions. Furthermore, Article IV of the New York Convention requires, as a condition of an award's enforcement, the production of the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.

When the ICC undertook to create a system of arbitration slightly more than 75 years ago, one of its paramount concerns was to obtain the broadest possible recognition of the arbitration agreement's validity, at least in respect of commercial relations. The 'Proposed Plan for Conciliation and Arbitration between Traders of Different Countries' that was elaborated by a special commission of the ICC in 1921 was, thus, accompanied by a 'Juridical Resolution' that resolved, among other things, that:

'...the arbitration clause, or undertaking to submit to arbitration disputes arising as to the interpretation or execution of contracts between traders and manufacturers, should be declared valid by all countries...'

In the intervening 75 years, due to the efforts of the ICC, among others, the arbitration agreement has gained enormous respect internationally-and is now treated by courts throughout the world with considerable deference. But notwithstanding the distance travelled since the ICC Court's creation, there remain pockets of resistance as well as a surprisingly large number of issues concerning the arbitration agreement as to which there continues to be disagreement or disharmony. As we approach the coming decade, therefore, we [Page106:] can reasonably anticipate that there will continue to be ample fields for international arbitration practitioners to plow in this regard.

It is not my intention, nor would it be possible in the context of this paper, to review comprehensively the many issues as to which there may still be disharmony or uncertainty internationally. However, I would like to try to identify some of the principal areas of ferment and to offer a few thoughts on related, possible trends. The relevant issues can conveniently be grouped in the following three broad categories: formal requirements; the nature of the arbitration agreement; and the limits of party autonomy. Each is now considered in turn.

II. Formal requirements

Ever since the publication of Neil Kaplan's seminal article on the subject in 1996,1 there has been growing criticism, most recently at the ICCA Congress in Paris in May 1998, of the 'agreement in writing' requirement, as set forth in Article II of the New York Convention (and the similar requirement in Article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law). Article II obligates Contracting States to recognize arbitration agreements only when 'in writing' and provides (Article II(2)) that:

'The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.'

The overarching purpose of the 'agreement in writing' requirement in Article II and the associated definition of such an agreement appears to have been 'to remedy the divergence of national laws regarding the form of the arbitration agreement' by creating an internationally uniform regime in this regard.2 And Article II has undoubtedly succeeded to a considerable extent in freeing international arbitration agreements from overly technical local requirements, thereby enhancing their uniform recognition and enforcement.

But in the years since Article II was promulgated, 'the needs of modern business practices'3 have shifted. Agreements may be evidenced in writing, but not necessarily signed. Terms recorded in writing may be tacitly accepted. Agreements may be assigned without any formal acceptance of the assignment by the other party. And under a growing number of bilateral and multilateral instruments, consent to arbitration may arise by treaty. In view of the many different ways in which arbitration may be agreed and the greater deference generally (but not universally) accorded to such agreements, there has been increasing movement internationally towards relaxing the formal requirements set forth in Article II. This is reflected not only in the comments of authorities such as Mr Kaplan and others,4 but also in a growing number of enactments on arbitration that define more expansively than does Article II the concept of a written agreement (see, e.g., the 1996 amendment of the law in Hong-Kong, the English Arbitration Act 1996, the new German Arbitration Law that entered into force on 1 January 1998 and, much earlier, the Swiss international arbitration statute of 1987) or dispense with the requirement of a writing altogether (as under the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996, which recognizes oral arbitration agreements). [Page107:]

The gradual liberalization, in a growing number of jurisdictions, of the definition of 'an agreement in writing' is a trend that is likely to continue. Little by little, therefore, the uniform regime that the New York Convention sought to create in this regard is being eroded. There does not appear, however, to be any prospect that the Convention will be amended in this or any other respect in the foreseeable future. As a consequence, it can reasonably be anticipated that there will be increasing instances where the requirements of the Convention diverge from more liberal national legislation (and possibly also more tolerant arbitration rules, such as the ICC Rules, which, unlike the UNCITRAL Rules, for example, do not require a written arbitration agreement).

There is therefore an increasing risk that arbitrations will be allowed to proceed in the more 'arbitration friendly' environments, only to falter at the final gate, when enforcement is sought elsewhere pursuant to the Convention. At the same time, given the apparent immutability of the Convention, there will be an increasing temptation in those jurisdictions most supportive of the arbitration process to construe the requirements of the Convention as loosely and broadly as possible, and possibly also unconventionally.

An example is furnished by the relatively recent US case of Sphere Drake Insurance PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc.,5 in which a US federal appeals court held that an arbitration agreement is an 'agreement in writing' within the meaning of Article II(2) if it is 'either (1) an arbitral clause in a contract or (2) an arbitration agreement, (a) signed by the parties or (b) contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams'.6 In other words, the US court read out of Article II(2) of the Convention any requirement that the contract in which the arbitral clause is contained be signed or result from an exchange of letters or telegrams. Although such an interpretation is against the weight of both judicial and scholarly authority internationally and the decision has been criticized by at least one US authority,7Sphere Drake has nevertheless been 'one of the most oftencited US cases on the interpretation and application of the "agreement in writing" requirement of Article II(2)',8 and has been expressly followed by at least one lower federal court in a different circuit.9 While it is too early to tell whether other US appeals courts will also adopt this interpretation, Sphere Drake serves to highlight the way in which, either wittingly or unwittingly, the court in question was able to circumvent the conventional construction of Article II's requirements.

In the coming decade, other conventional notions concerning the Convention and its construction may increasingly be subject to reconsideration. Among these is the very proposition, espoused by Professor van den Berg and most other authorities, that the requirements of Article II(2) may, in fact, be invoked in order to frustrate the enforcement of an award under the Convention. The orthodox notion is that this follows inexorably from Article V(1)(a), which states that recognition and enforcement may be refused upon proof that:

'[T]he agreement referred to in Article II ... is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made... [Emphasis added.]'10

Professor van den Berg has written that, apart from certain jurisprudence of the Italian Supreme Court, which has since been superseded, 'no court has doubted that the words "the agreement referred to in Article II" in ground (a) of Article V(1) imply that the lack of the written form of the arbitration agreement [Page108:] as required by Article II(2) constitutes a ground for refusal of enforcement of an arbitral award'.11 But Article V(1) does not refer expressly to the requirements of Article II(2), and the drafting of that provision is not translucent, as Professor van den Berg has recognized.

There surely can be no doubt that it would be inconsistent with the aims of the Convention, and possibly lead to anomalous results, if a court could, in refusing to enforce an award, invoke formal requirements more onerous than those set forth in Article II(2) for the recognition of the arbitration agreement underlying that award. To that extent, at least, the conditions of Article II(2) ought to apply. But where the relevant requirements of national law are more liberal than the Convention, as is increasingly the case, it would seem contrary to the spirit of the Convention and, in particular, Article VII (a provision that has been the subject of increasing attention), to hold parties to a stricter requirement. Article VII(1) of the Convention provides that:

'The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.'

It has, thus, been argued that a court called upon to enforce a foreign award under the Convention should, in lieu of the standard set forth in Article II(2), apply the law of the place of enforcement, if more favourable, on the basis of the above provision.12 But Professor van den Berg has countered that 'if the [morefavourablerule] provision of Article VII(1) is resorted to' in seeking enforcement of an award arising out of an arbitration agreement that does not conform to the requirements of Article II(2), 'the Convention becomes inapplicable in toto, and the enforcement has to be sought exclusively on the other basis.'13 In many countries, there is, however, no separate regime for the enforcement of foreign awards different from that set forth in the Convention. Thus, for example, in Switzerland, where the definition of an arbitration agreement in international cases (Article 178 of the PIL) is indisputably broader than Article II(2) of the Convention, it is nevertheless stipulated that (Article 194 of the PIL) the 'recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is governed by the New York Convention'. In these circumstances, can Article 178 legitimately be said to override Article II(2), to the extent applicable, on the basis of Article VII?

Entirely apart from this possible concern, Article VII refers only to the 'law of the country where... [the] award is sought to be relied upon'. If read literally, it therefore may not be of any assistance where the arbitration agreement complies with the formal requirements of the laws specifically referred to in Article V(1) (i.e., the law, if any, to which the parties have subjected the arbitration agreement or the law of the place of the arbitration), but not the formal requirements of Article II(2), and the laws of the place of enforcement are not more liberal than that article. Yet as it would not ordinarily seem reasonable for an enforcing court to refuse to enforce an award for noncompliance with the requirements of Article II(2) when the underlying agreement is valid under the laws referred to in Article V(1), enforcing courts may increasingly be inclined to reject the traditional view that the conditions of Article II(2) are required to be satisfied under Article V(1) or that Article II(2) [Page109:] lays down a universal rule, to the exclusion of a more liberal local regime. Alternatively, enforcing courts may more willingly be drawn to the position of Jan Paulsson that Article V(1) leaves them with the discretion to refuse or grant enforcement in the circumstances set forth in that article.14

III. The nature of the agreement

One of the most significant developments of the last four decades since the promulgation of the New York Convention has been the widespread recognition of 'international' arbitration as a distinctive form of arbitration warranting its own legal regime, separate from the one applicable to its 'domestic' version. Although the New York Convention applies generally to 'foreign' arbitral awards and does not itself seek to distinguish between domestic and international arbitration-save in the second sentence of Article I(1), a provision that has received substantially more attention in the United States than elsewhere15 -national arbitration legislation, as in France and Switzerland and as contemplated by the UNCITRAL Model Law, has increasingly come to embrace such a distinction. As a consequence, the characterization of an arbitration agreement as either 'domestic' or 'international' will, in many jurisdictions, affect the nature of the recourse available against the award. Indeed, it may even affect the arbitration agreement's validity.16

More than ten years ago, in what appeared to many to represent an idiosyncratic move against the modern trend, the Netherlands adopted a new arbitration act (the Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986) that was made applicable to both domestic and international arbitration. Within the last two years, both England and Germany have now done the same (see the English Arbitration Act 1996 and the new German Arbitration law that entered into force on 1 January 1998). For its part, the ICC, for the first time in its 1998 arbitration rules, explicitly stated in the body of those rules (Article 1(1)) that it would accept jurisdiction over disputes 'not of an international character'. Could it be that the Dutch were more modern than the proponents of a distinctive regime for 'international' arbitration? Do the new English and German laws presage a possible new trend for the decade ahead?

In commenting on the new German act, Professor Böckstiegel has observed that, as it is not restricted to 'international' arbitration, 'Parties, arbitrators and judges do not have to deal with the sometimes difficult distinction between national and international arbitration.'17 And indeed, notwithstanding the widelyheld sentiment that international and domestic arbitrations are 'different animals', there is less of a consensus internationally as to what is, in fact, 'international' and what is not. An arbitration may be considered to be domestic in one country simply because both of the parties are domiciled there, while in others it may be regarded as international if at least one is foreignowned, or the transaction, as in the case of French and US law, has a sufficient foreign nexus.

Increasingly, the need to make the distinction is a source of difficulty and uncertainty, as is presently the case in Hong Kong, for example, where arbitrations may be viewed as international on one side of the new administrative frontier with the rest of China and as domestic on the other. During the preparation of the new English arbitration law, meanwhile, concerns [Page110:] were voiced as to whether distinctions on the basis of nationality or domicile might, insofar as European parties are concerned, run afoul of European law, an issue that may one day find its way into the courts. As the world becomes more and more interdependent and interconnected, it is reasonable to anticipate that the distinctions between the domestic and the international will become increasingly blurred, and the conventional rationale for distinguishing between the two may increasingly be subject to doubt.

In addition to making its new law on arbitration applicable to all arbitrations, whether domestic or international, Germany has not, as under the UNCITRAL Model Law, restricted it to 'commercial' arbitration so that users 'do not have to worry about the sometimes difficult and controversial definition of the term "commercial"'.18 In this regard, even though the concept of 'commercial' arbitration has long been broadly understood in most jurisdictions where arbitration is restricted to 'commercial' matters, the frontiers of the arbitrable have constantly been expanding. Although this paper is not concerned with issues of arbitrability, it might nevertheless be noted that, looking to the future, difficult issues are likely to arise, as they already have in various jurisdictions, with respect to the validity of arbitration agreements and the means of recourse available against awards in the case of matters that have typically been considered to be of a noncommercial nature, such as, e.g., contracts with consumers.

IV. The limits of party autonomy

The modern development of arbitration internationally has been accompanied, and indeed encouraged, by the great respect accorded to the autonomy of the parties. Progressively, in certain jurisdictions, arbitration has, in various respects, been delegalized, denationalized and delocalized, But inevitably, the limits to which the parties' autonomy may be pushed have been, and will continue to be, tested. One of the more interesting issues to emerge within the last few years in this regard is whether parties may validly agree to judicial review of the award in excess of that provided by statute. The same question might be raised with respect to the parties' right to derogate contractually from the defences to enforcement set forth in the New York Convention.

In LaPine Technology Corporation v. Kyocera Corporation,19 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that judicial review in excess of that provided for by statute was permissible. In Société Diseno v. Société Mendes,20 the Paris Court of Appeal held that it was not.

Kyocera concerns an arbitration that was conducted under the ICC Rules of Arbitration in San Francisco. The arbitration was commenced on the basis of the following arbitration clause:

'The arbitrators shall issue a written award which shall state the basis of the award and include detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California may enter judgement upon any award, either by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify or correct [Page111:] any award: (i) based upon, any of the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act; (ii) where the arbitrators' findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii) where the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous.'

Following the issuance of an arbitral award that was unfavourable to Kyocera, it made a motion to the US District Court in San Francisco to have the award vacated on the grounds, inter alia, that the arbitral tribunal's findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence and that the tribunal had made substantial errors of law. The District Court refused to vacate the award and, in doing so, held that it had only considered the statutory grounds for review under the FAA, which do not include the review of the arbitrators' findings of fact or law. The District Court held that 'the parties may not by agreement alter by expansion the provisions for judicial review contained in the Federal Arbitration Act.'21 On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case to the District Court for reconsideration. The Court of Appeal held, with one judge concurring and one dissenting, that the District Court was required to honour the parties' contract for heightened judicial scrutiny of the arbitrators' award because 'the primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate'. The Ninth Circuit's decision, although consistent with a previous ruling of another US Court of Appeal,22 was considered by the dissenting judge to conflict with yet another Court of Appeal decision, in which it was held that parties 'cannot contract for judicial review' of an arbitration award.23 The concurring judge, meanwhile, expressed certain reservations concerning the right of the parties to 'impose on the federal courts burdens and functions, that Congress has withheld', and, while supporting the court's decision in this case, nevertheless observed that he 'would call the case differently if the agreement provided that the district judge would review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of dead fowl'.

Although obtained with the amicus curiae support of a variety of trade and other organizations, the Kyocera decision has been the subject of criticism in the United States, primarily on the ground that the parties may not by agreement create obligations binding on a court.24 But the court's decision nevertheless has strong equitable appeal insofar as the enhanced judicial scrutiny provided for in the arbitral clause may be said to be indissociable from the parties' agreement to arbitrate.

In France, the courts have resolved the issues arising in the Kyocera case in a different manner. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, they have refused to endorse agreements for heightened judicial scrutiny of international awards, and they have gone a step further, i.e., they have found to be null and unenforceable an arbitration clause containing such an agreement. Thus, in Diseno,25 the Paris Court of Appeal annulled an international arbitration award rendered in France because the underlying arbitration clause provided for the possible 'appeal' of the arbitrators' award. Under French law, the 'appeal' of an arbitration award-that is, an application for judicial review of the arbitrators' findings of fact and law-is permitted only in the case of domestic, as opposed to international, awards. The only recourse that is permitted with respect to the latter, if rendered in France, is an action for the award's annulment pursuant to Articles 1504 and 1502 of the New Code of Civil Procedure. Finding that the provision for an appeal contained in an arbitration clause was null in the Diseno case,26 the Court of Appeal went on to hold that the arbitration clause as a [Page112:] whole, and accordingly the arbitration award rendered pursuant thereto, should also be annulled because the appeal provision 'constituted an essential element' of the arbitration procedure to which the parties had consented.

In the Kyocera case, the lower court, while concluding, like the Paris court in Diseno, that the parties could not validly expand the scope of available judicial review, nevertheless refused to find that the arbitration clause was rendered unenforceable as a consequence. Rather, it considered that there was 'a clear cleavage ... between the arbitration procedure to be conducted by the arbitrators and the review of the arbitration procedure to be conducted by the court ... [and the] motivations of the parties in contracting for the defined scope of the judicial review are unknown to the court...'27

Whatever may have been the motivations of the parties, however, the circumstances underlying the Kyocera and Diseno cases illustrate that the requirements of parties may sometimes be at variance from prevailing notions as to what is in their best interest. Speaking on the subject of arbitration awards a few years ago in Hong Kong, Fali Nariman dwelt on what he acknowledged to be an unpopular subject with arbitrators: their 'fallibility'.28 As recourse to arbitration continues to spread in the next decade, there may be further instances where parties seek some degree of review or supervision over the awards of arbitrators.

V. Conclusion

As indicated at the outset, this is not intended to be a comprehensive review of issues concerning the arbitration agreement as they relate to the enforcement of awards, nor have the most important issues necessarily even been identified. If there is any lesson to be learned, however, from the issues discussed above it is that the needs of users and the trends that they may engender are in a continual state of evolution. The ICC's goal, 75 years ago, of obtaining the broadest possible recognition of the arbitration agreement, has in large measure been attained. But going forward, there will continue to be curves in the road.

1
Kaplan, 'Is the need for writing out of step with commercial practice?' 12 Arbitration International, No 1, p. 27 (1996).

2
Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958 (Kluwer 1981) p. 173. It also is often suggested that the purpose of the writing requirement is to protect the parties to the arbitration agreement. Id. That is, the writing requirement ensures that a party does not unwittingly renounce its right to judicial relief. However, some, such as Andreas Reiner, have argued that, although this concern may be valid in the domestic context, it is no longer necessarily a legitimate concern in the international context. In Dr Reiner's view, parties to an international business transaction do not need to be so much protected from arbitration, as from courts. Andreas Reiner, 'La forme du pouvoir du mandataire pour signer une convention d'arbitrage et l'article II(2) de la Convention de New York', p. 6 (paper presented at the 14th ICCA Congress, Paris, May 1998) ('En réalité les acteurs du commerce international ne doivent pas être protégés de l'arbitrage, mais des juridictions étatiques.').

3
Kaplan, supra, note 1, p. 29.

4
See, e.g., Alvarez, 'Article II(2) of the New York Convention and the Courts' and Reiner, 'La Forme du Pouvoir du Mandataire pour Signer une Convention d'Arbitrage et l'Article II(2) de la Convention de New York', papers (not yet published) presented at the 1998 ICCA Congress.

5
16 F. 3d 666 (5th Cir. 1994).

6
Id., p. 669.

7
Paul D. Friedland, 'US Courts Misapplication of the "Agreement in Writing" Requirement for the Enforcement of an Arbitration Agreement under the New York Conventio' 13 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep., No. 5, pp. 21, 26 (May 1998).

8
Id.

9
See Kahn Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark International Lid., 1997 US Dist. Lexis 11916, p. 12 (SDNY 1997). See also Richard Hill, 'Formal Requirements for Arbitration Agreements: Does Kahn Lucas Lancaster v. Lark International Open Pandora's Box?' 12 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep., No 10, p. 18 (October 1997); and Friedland, supra, note 7, pp. 2930 (discussing other US cases in which Article II(2) has in his view been misapplied).

10
See also Article IV, which requires the production to the enforcing court of the 'original agreement referred to in Article II or a duly certified copy thereof'. Irrespective of the manner in which Article II(2) and V(1) may be construed, this requirement may be sufficient to trump the enforcement of an award if, for example, the original documents have disappeared.

11
Van den Berg, 'The New York Convention: its intended Effects, its Interpretation, Salient Problem Areas' in The New York Convention of 1958 (ASA Conference series No 9, 1996) pp. 2543.

12
See Poudret, 'Discrepancies Between the New York Convention and Chapter 12 of the Swiss PIL' in The New York Convention of 1958 (SA Special Series No 9, 1996) p. 238.

13
Van den Berg, supra, note 2, p. 180. See also Friedland, supra, note 7, p. 36: '[I]f a party [relies on local law as permitted by Article VII(1)], enforcement would be obtained outside the Convention altogether...'

14
Paulsson, 'Enforcing Arbitral Awards Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment (LSA)' The ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, Vol. 9/No 1 (May 1998) pp. 14-17.

15
The relevant portion of Article I(1) provides: '[The Convention] ... shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.' On the basis of this provision, US courts, unlike courts in most jurisdiction, have applied the Convention to 'nondomestic' awards rendered in the United States. See most recently the case of Lander Co. v. MW Investments, Inc., 107 F. 3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997) and the discussion of the related US jurisprudence in Rau, 'The New York Convention in American Courts' 7 The American Review of International Arbitration, Nos 34 (1996) p. 213.

16
Thus, for example, an agreement for the arbitration of future disputes is still regarded as null in a noninternational civil contract in France pursuant to Article 2061 of the French Civil Code, an anachronism in a country that has been at the forefront of arbitration's development internationally.

17
Böckstiegel, 'An Introduction to the New German Arbitration Act Based on the UNCITRAL Model Law' 14 Arbitration international No 1 (1998) pp. 19-22.

18
Id.

19
130 F. 3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997) ('Kyocera').

20
Cour d'appel de Paris (27 October 1994), Rev. Arb. (1995) p. 263.

21
LaPine Technology Corporation v. Kyocera Corporation, 909 F. Supp. 697, 705 (ND Cal. 1995).

22
Gateway Technologies, lnc. v. MCI Telecommunication Corporation, 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995): 'When... the parties agree contractually to subject an arbitration award to expanded judicial review, federal arbitration policy demands that the court conduct its review according to the terms of the arbitration contract.'

23
Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago SunTimes, 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991). The case in question did not arise under the FAA, however.

24
See Abby Cohen Smutny, 'Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: Comment on the Ninth Circuit Decision in LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.' 13 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep., No 2, p. 18; and James B. Hamlin, 'Defining the Scope of Judicial Review by Agreement of the Parties' in the same publication p. 25.

25
Supra, note 20.

26
This finding was, in fact, consistent with an earlier decision of the French Court of Cassation in the case of Société Buzzichelli Holding v. Hennion et autre (6 April 1994) Rev. arb. (1995), p. 263, and the Paris Court of Appeal in Société Sermi v. Me Hennion ès qualités (24 April 1992) Rev. arb. (1992), p. 598.

27
Supra, note 21, p. 697.

28
Nariman, 'Arbitration Awards-Challenge and Enforcement' Globalization and Harmonization of the Basic Notions in International Arbitration (IFCAI/HKIAC 1996) pp. 168-69.